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 ACTUARIAL VALUES 
 





This paper seeks to identify the characteristic values implicit in contemporary actuarial 
thought and practice.   `Values' is used here to mean fundamental concepts which we 
use, largely intuitively, to guide our patterns of thought and behaviour.   We consider to 
what extent these values are characteristic simply because actuarial work attracts 
individuals who already subscribe to them, and to what extent these values may be 
inculcated by actuarial training.   We then consider whether the characteristic values we 
have identified are congruent with the changing values of wider society, and whether 




 AKTUARIELLE WERTVORSTELLUNGEN 
 






Diese Arbeit moechte die charakteristischen Werte identifizieren, die zeitgenoessischer 
aktuarieller Denkweise und Taetigkeit zu Grunde liegen.  Der Begriff "Werte" steht hier 
fuer die grundlegenden Konzepte, die - grossenteils intuitiv - unsere Denk - und 
Verhaltensmuster leiten. Wir beleuchten, in welchem Ausmass diese Werte einfach  
deshalb charakteristisch sind, weil aktuarielle Arbeit Personen anzieht, die gerade solche 
Wertvorstellungen haben, und in welchem Ausmass sie moeglicherweise durch die 
aktuarielle Ausbildung gepraegt werden. Wir wenden uns dann der Frage zu, ob die von 
uns identifizierten Werte sich mit den wandelnden allgemeinen gesellschaftlichen 
Werten decken und ob sie wohl dem weiteren Erfolg des Berufstandes im 21. 




 In this paper we seek to identify the characteristic values implicit in 
contemporary actuarial thought and practice.   In this context, the idea of values 
is not easy to define, and has been considered at length elsewhere (Sharp, 1997). 
  But for the purpose of this paper, values mean fundamental concepts which we 
use, largely intuitively, to determine our patterns of thought and behaviour.   
This definition may be clarified by comparing values with attitudes or opinions. 
 
 The essential difference between values as opposed to attitudes or opinions is 
that values tend to be more fundamental and less susceptible to change, at least 
in the short term.   For example, we may arrive at this Congress with a negative 
attitude towards the city of Birmingham, but that might be changed by the 
delightful experience of our week here;  we may hold the opinion that 
Birmingham has an unfavourable climate, but that opinion will (hopefully) be 
dispelled by the fine weather which greets this Congress;  but our values may 
include a British patriotism which deters us from expressing our unflattering 
opinions and attitudes about Birmingham.   Thus conservatism, radicalism, 
liberalism, authoritarianism, loyalty, honesty, prudence, theism and religiosity 
are all values. 
 
 It is of course questionable to what extent a profession can be said to have 
characteristic values.   Some might wish to argue that actuarial science, if not 
practice, is a scientific discipline, and therefore value-free.   One might also 
expect the diversity of individuals within the profession to frustrate any attempt 
to identify characteristic values.   However, it would be surprising if the lengthy 
training required for professions in general, and ours in particular, did not have 
some effect on personal values.   This commonsense view that lengthy 
professional training inculcates characteristic values is supported, at least for 
other disciplines, by carefully designed empirical studies, to which we shall refer 
later. 
 
 We stress that we are concerned only with values as they affect, and may be 
observed in, actuarial practice.   We are not concerned in this paper with the 
values which guide individual actuaries' behaviour outside of their professional 
role.   Of course, for many (but not all) individuals the values to which they 
subscribe in the professional and personal spheres may be similar;  but our 
concern is with professional practice, not personal lives. 
 
 Those who question our premise that members of a profession will typically 
have some common characteristic values may also question whether identifying 
such values is a useful exercise.   One justification is simply that self-knowledge 
is generally beneficial.   A second, less existential justification is the observation 
that both historically and today, human values affect insurance practice and 
indeed whether insurance is permitted at all.   For example, the principles of 
western insurance are largely incompatible with the Islamic principles of 
Shariah, and hence with the values of nearly half the world's population.   The 
alternative form of insurance organised on takaful principles in sympathy with 
Islamic values may have very much better prospects in many countries than the 
western style of insurance.   In this paper we are concerned primarily with values 
in the western world;  but the example of Islamic insurance illustrates that values 
may have very direct commercial implications.  A third justification for seeking 
to identify characteristic actuarial values is that it will put us in a position to 
consider whether those values remain congruent with the rest of (western) 
society.   It is at least possible that values which have allowed a profession to 
flourish in the past could lead to its isolation and irrelevance in the future. 
 
 The rest of this paper is organised as follows.   In the next section we identify 
what we regard as characteristic values of the actuarial profession.   We then 
briefly consider to what extent these values are characteristic simply because 
actuarial work attracts individuals who already subscribe to them, and to what 
extent these values may be inculcated by actuarial training:  that is, in loose 
terms, the question of "nature or nurture?".   Finally, we consider whether the 
characteristic values we have identified are congruent with the changing values 
of wider society, and whether they are likely to be conducive to the continuing 
success of the profession as it enters the 21st century. 
 





 One way of establishing people's values would be simply to ask that they 
describe them in their own words.   The problem with this is the inescapable 
desire to represent oneself in a favourable light, and so one therefore needs to 
consider not just what people say when asked about their values, but also what 
they say or write in other contexts, and what they do.   For this paper, our main 
approach has been to distil values from actuarial literature in general, illustrating 
the values we identify by citing examples of actuarial works in which they are 




 Possibly the most characteristic value of actuaries is prudence.   It manifests 
itself in many forms, most obviously a preoccupation with insurers' solvency 
(the original raison d'etre of the profession), and a bias towards funding as 
opposed to pay-as-you-go in pensions and social security.  In the UK, these 
concerns arguably have their roots in the failures of life offices in the nineteenth 
century, and the role which actuaries subsequently developed in monitoring and 
safeguarding the solvency of insurance institutions.   They have been 
periodically reinforced by the ignominy associated with occasional failures of 




 Closely related to prudence is conservatism. 
 
 Actuaries are, on the whole, socially conservative rather than unconventional.  A 
survey of prospective entrants to the profession (reported in The Actuary, July 
1997) suggests that, in the UK at least, aspiring actuaries are Conservative as 
well as conservative.   Of course, these characteristics are probably shared by the 
professions in general.    
 
2.4 The pecuniary perspective 
 
 Prospective new students attending for interview in the university department of 
one of the authors are routinely asked why they have chosen to study Actuarial 
Science.  The answers are varied, and commonly include ability and interest in 
Mathematics, desire to achieve a respected professional qualification, and 
sometimes parental pressure.   However, one consideration receives more 
mentions than any other:  money.   The actuarial profession in the United 
Kingdom has, for good or ill, the reputation of being exceptionally well 
rewarded, and the salience they attach to this may well be the characteristic 
which best distinguishes applicants for the course in Actuarial Science from 
applicants for courses in related disciplines such as Mathematics or Statistics. 
 
 So what?   Making money may not be a particularly heroic aim, but it is a 
relatively innocent one;  and insofar as it is a spur to effort and achievement, it 
may be societally beneficial.   But the desire for personal financial security is 
actually only an adjunct to a more subtle and pervasive value which is nurtured 
by actuarial training, namely a pecuniary perspective on the world.    
 As actuarial students progress through their academic studies and their 
subsequent professional training, they deal day in, day out with a world in which 
all human experience is monetised:  accident, injury, sickness, disability, and 
even (or rather, especially) death all submit to actuarial monetisation.   The 
possibility that there might be other valid perspectives on human experience has 
no place in the actuary's professional universe.  After such a training, it is hardly 
surprising if actuaries tend to see the world largely through a financial prism. 
 
 Again, so what?   The actuary's financial prism may well be a particularly clear 
means of viewing the world, and a useful way of dealing with all its problems.   
However, the danger is that rather than using their view through a financial 
prism as just a useful way of looking at the world, actuaries come to regard it as 
uniquely representing reality, and assume that others must see the world in the 
same way.   The assumption that others share, or even respect, our values may 
cause considerable difficulties for a profession, and this is a point we shall return 
to later. 
 
 Whilst contemporary western society is broadly accepting of the principle that 
human life and death may be monetised through insurance contracts, we have 
already noted that there is much less acceptance of the principles of insurance in 
Islamic societies.  Interestingly, western society has by no means always adopted 
its contemporary attitude of acceptance towards life insurance.   For example, 
Zelizer (1983) describes the hostility of the Church (and wider public opinion) to 
life insurance in nineteenth century America.  
 
2.5 Equity and mutuality 
 
 All actuarial students soon encounter the actuarial attachment to the idea of 
equity, particularly in life insurance.   The concept of equity is seldom well 
defined, but it is one to which actuaries refer in justifying their decisions and 
actions in two broad areas:  risk selection, and the distribution of surplus.    
 
 As regards risk classification, one version of the actuarial view of equity has 
been provided by Wilkie (1997).   He uses the term mutuality, which he defines 
as a risk pooling system in which each individual "pays the price appropriate to 
the risk which he or she brings to the insurance pool".   We would prefer to say 
that each individual pays the price set by the insurer, if indeed it is prepared to 
offer any insurance coverage. 
 
 Another nomenclature for mutuality or equity in risk classification is provided 
by the phrases actuarially fair or actuarially neutral.   The pervasiveness of the 
values underlying these terms is well illustrated by the observation that many 
actuaries do not distinguish between actuarial fairness and any other concepts of 
fairness in underwriting practice. 
 
 At this point, we may note that the various actuarial values we describe are not 
necessarily congruent, and in some circumstances may conflict with one another. 
  The quintessentially actuarial issue of the distribution of surplus in a with-
profits fund provides an example of such a conflict between competing values, 
namely equity and prudence.   Broadly speaking, equity is often perceived to 
demand that members of each generation of maturing policyholders receive a 
full share of surplus funds arising from the investment of the premiums they 
have paid.   Prudence, on the other hand, demands that something be held back 
from each generation as a safety margin. 
 
2.6 Collective before individual 
 
 The actuarial profession is characteristically concerned with, and applies its 
expertise to, the collective welfare rather than individual welfare.   The actuary is 
concerned with policyholders as a group, not with the welfare of individuals.    
 In our view, this `collective before individual' value is a particularly important 
one, for two reasons.   First, we believe it contributes to the two further values 
discussed below.   Second, it is in marked contrast to the characteristic values of 
two other prominent professions, medicine and the law.   The medical paradigm 
places the welfare of the individual patient above all other considerations.   
Similarly, the lawyer will more often than not find himself prosecuting or 
defending the individual rights of his client.   Of course, on many occasions 
lawyers act for corporate bodies or governments, but nevertheless a significant 
proportion of lawyers and legal activity are concerned with prosecuting, 
defending or adjudicating upon the rights of individuals.  The actuary, in 
contrast, is almost never concerned with the welfare of the individual, but only 
with the group;  and quite often, appears concerned with protecting and 
advancing the interests of a corporate body against the interests of individuals.    
 
 The previous paragraph paints the actuarial profession in a slightly unflattering 
light, which is not entirely fair (for reasons we will discuss below).   However, 
whether or not actuaries think it is a fair picture, we think there is a strong 
possibility that the picture painted above may be that which the rest of the world 
sees.   This may be accentuated by the further values we discuss in 2.7 and 2.8 
below. 
 
 It may be argued that the primary reason for actuaries' preoccupation with 
collective rather than individual welfare is the nature of the underlying science.  
Actuarial science, like all statistical disciplines, is meaningful and useful only in 
the context of groups:  it has nothing to contribute to the welfare of the 
individual in isolation.   Thus actuaries' lack of professional concern for 
individual welfare may stem largely from the very nature of their expertise, 
which pertains to collective rather than individual welfare. 
 
 Some time after this section of the paper was originally written, we were 
interested to discover that this `collective before individual' value had been 
identified by a very distinguished earlier author, the late Frank Redington.   In 
the context of the distribution of surplus, the "actuarial fable" in The flock and 
the sheep and other essays (Redington, 1981) gently chided the actuarial 
profession with the criticism that "We take care of the flock but we forget the 
sheep".   Redington reinforced the point by remarking that "The actuarial 
shepherd is deeply conditioned to think in terms of the flock, for that is where 
his professional skill lies". 
 
 However, nothing in the scientific underpinnings of actuarial work dictates that 
actuaries must favour the interests of business or industry above those of a 
collective of individuals - for example, the customers of industry - considered as 
a group.   In fact, however, actuaries generally do seem to concern themselves 
with the interests of business rather than consumers, a phenomenon which is 




 The growth of the consumer rights movement has been one of the most 
significant social changes in developed economies in the past 30 years, and over 
this period consumerism has blossomed into a broad social and legislative trend. 
  Actuarial comment on this trend has generally tended to be disparaging.   Two 
convenient examples amongst many are Corley (1989), and Gupta & Westall 
(1993).   Actuaries such as these authors make their views on consumerism very 
plain.   Corley, for example, in his presidential address to the Institute of 
Actuaries, suggested that 
 
 "... it is tempting to float the idea that the various consumer lobbies in this 
country seldom reflect the long-term interests of the real consumers.   Indeed, it 
is possible to suggest that, with their short time horizon, the various consumer 
lobbies have done as much damage to the manufacture of British domestic goods 
as the actions of any trade union, government or management".    
 Gupta & Westall, in a paper to the Institute of Actuaries on Distribution of 
financial services, present their critical view of consumerism in the following 
terms: 
 
 "... Generally consumerism encompasses: 
 
 - the consumer movement's belief that there must always be someone 
(other than the consumer) who is to blame, who should meet any losses 
by the consumer; 
 
 - regulation rather than existing law is preferable; 
 
 - the consumer always wants the maximum information;  and 
 
 - if all else fails, there must be a compensation scheme." 
 
 They go on to list various alleged adverse consequences of consumerism;  and 
then re-emphasise their view in reply to the discussion, stating that 
"Consumerism means to us the consumer movement.   We believe it has some 
things fundamentally wrong." 
 
 It might be expected that actuaries expressing hostility towards consumerism 
would be concerned only with its effects on the insurance industry;  but in fact 
the actuarial authors referred to above seem to have gone out of their way to 
disparage consumerism on a much broader canvas.   Actuarial authors who seek 
to advance the cause of consumerism, on the other hand, seem to be thin on the 
ground (to be honest, we were unable to find any). 
 
 In the specific context of life assurance, actuarial hostility to consumerism has 
taken the form of general opposition to disclosure of commissions and expenses 
at the point of sale.   In the UK, this debate was played out in the early 1990s, 
with the principal protagonists being the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), the 
National Consumer Council and the Consumers' Association on the one hand, 
and the insurance industry and the actuarial profession on the other.  British 
readers will know that the opposition of the insurance industry and the actuarial 
profession to these developments was ultimately futile, in that most of what they 
opposed was enacted anyway.    
 
 Just after we had written this section of the paper (in October 1997) the views in 
it were confirmed by the appearance of headlines in the British press along the 
lines of "Consumer watchdogs slam actuaries' proposals [on the future of 
financial regulation (Fishman et al, 1997)]".   Once again it seemed that actuaries 
were at loggerheads with those concerned for consumers' interests.   Given that 
the authors of Fishman et al included one of the authors quoted earlier in this 
section, the concern of consumer groups is understandable.    
 
2.8 Anti-human rights 
 
 This value is directly derived from actuaries' concern with collective rather than 
individual welfare.   It is similar to actuarial disapproval of consumerism in that 
it represents the opposition of actuaries to an international legislative and social 
trend.  In recent years many countries have enacted legislation which inhibits 
discrimination on the basis of individual characteristics, such as gender, racial 
origin, disability or sexual orientation.  Examples include Sex Discrimination 
Acts (UK, 1975 and 1986;  Australia, 1984;  Civil Rights Act, US, 1964);  
Disability Discrimination Acts (US, 1990;  Australia, 1992;  UK, 1995);  and all-
encompassing legislation such as the New Zealand Human Rights Act (1993). 
 
 The principal reason why these Acts potentially impinge on insurance is that 
they are generally directed at outlawing not only irrational discrimination but 
also statistical discrimination.   It may be helpful to offer a definition of these 
two terms.   Irrational discrimination is just what it says:  in an employment 
context, Nobel prizewinner Kenneth Arrow defined it as "the valuation in the 
marketplace of personal characteristics of the worker which are unrelated to 
productivity".   An example might be the payment of female employees at lower 
rates than men, for work of the same standard, simply because they are female.   
Statistical discrimination, on the other hand, may be defined as the valuation of 
personal characteristics which are statistically correlated with productivity (or 
whatever else the discriminator wishes to select for).  An example might be an 
employer's policy not to promote young women to managerial posts because of 
evidence that promoted females are on average less productive than males, 
because maternity causes them to take more time off work.   This statistical 
discrimination is (a) not irrational but nevertheless (b) is perceived as unfair, and 
therefore outlawed, in many contexts in an increasing number of jurisdictions.   
The statistical justification for the discriminatory practice is not regarded as 
adequate grounds for permitting it. 
 
 This creates a problem for insurance, inasmuch that underwriting is nothing if 
not statistical discrimination.   However, for the purposes of insurance the 
statistical justification for discrimination is often (although not always) regarded 
as sufficient grounds to permit it.   As a result, the Acts referred to above 
invariably make special provisions for insurance, for example to permit 
underwriting provided if it is based on "actuarial or statistical data or other 
information on which it is reasonable to rely" (to quote the United Kingdom's 
Disability Discrimination Act).   One might have thought that this would satisfy 
actuarial concerns, and that bearing in mind the substantial political support for 
anti-discrimination measures, the profession might refrain from further 
comment.   But in fact, actuaries have consistently expressed their opposition to 
such legislation;  apart from papers specifically on underwriting, presidents of 
actuarial associations worldwide have used their presidential addresses to 
express disapproval of human rights legislation.   For example, presidents of 
actuarial societies in South Africa (Keir, 1994), Australia (Burgess, 1995) and 
Scotland (Grace, 1997) have used their presidential addresses to make such 
remarks.    
 
 In some cases, these authors appear to suggest that the actuarial profession 
should campaign actively against groups concerned with the rights of (for 
example) disabled persons, or homosexuals, or other minority groups:  to quote 
Burgess (1995), "...I believe we need to do more than just draw attention to the 
implications of ignoring significant rating factors and instead go on the offensive 
[our italics] and seek to educate policymakers and influencers of policy who 
advocate further restrictions on the right to underwrite".   Similarly, Grace 
(1997) writing about the UK's Disability Discrimination Act, suggests that "the 
actuarial profession...must be prepared to make its voice heard", by implication 
for the purpose of defending the insurance industry against disabled litigants.   
As far as we are aware, no other professions have expressed similar views or 
intentions:  they appear to be distinctively actuarial. 
 
 We tried, but were unable, to find any examples of actuaries expressing support 
for human rights legislation, or actuaries who were concerned with the interests 
of the individuals whom such legislation seeks to protect.   The overwhelming 
impression from actuarial literature, press releases and public statements is that 
actuaries are opposed to the international trend to introduce anti-discrimination 
legislation, and hostile to those whose rights it seeks to protect.    
 
 Many actuaries would protest that their opposition to human rights legislation is 
based on a belief that restrictions on underwriting may impede the (actuarial) 
fairness of underwriting.   Although it is not central to this paper, we would 
remark that such an appeal to fairness is a weak argument.   Statistical 
discrimination in underwriting is not obviously more or less fair than statistical 
discrimination in employment or in any other area;  if the latter type of 
discrimination is perceived as so unfair that it should be outlawed, then fairness 
provides little justification for special provisions for underwriting.   A better 
argument in support of such special provisions would be that they are to some 
extent necessary for private insurance - although the phrase to some extent is an 




 As a final item on our list of actuarial values, it is worth mentioning one value 
which we might have expected to identify, but in fact did not observe.   In view 
of the mathematical basis of actuarial science, it might be expected that actuaries 
would have a certain respect or reverence for mathematics, and strong 
convictions about the usefulness of a mathematical approach to the problems 
with which they deal.   But in reality, actuaries (at least in the United Kingdom) 
are more often disparaging about those who use more advanced mathematics 
than they do themselves, deploying what they see as a healthy disregard for 
"technical" or "theoretical" matters.   Views in this area do vary considerably 
amongst actuaries, and some regret the rather lukewarm attitude of the 
profession in general towards mathematical refinement;  as one speaker, (Wilkie, 
1993) at the Institute of Actuaries put it, "it is all too easy in this Hall to get a 
sympathetic laugh by ridiculing those who introduce an integral sign or a 




 In this section we have identified a range of values which we think are 
characteristic of the actuarial profession;  some are flattering, others perhaps less 
so.   In the next section, we will consider when and how actuaries come to 
acquire these values. 
 
3. Selection or inculcation? 
 
 
3.1 Two possibilities 
 
 When we consider the means by which actuaries acquire the characteristic 
values outlined above, we see two principal possibilities.   The first is that 
actuarial work attracts individuals who already hold, or are at least predisposed 
towards, some or all of these values.   The second is that the values are `caught' 
(and perhaps partly `taught') as part of actuarial training.   We may conveniently 
(albeit inelegantly) label these two possibilities as `self-selection' and 
`inculcation'. 
 
 Commonsense suggests that the balance between self-selection and inculcation 
will vary accordingly to the particular value being considered.   For example, the 
pecuniary perspective may be partly attributable to self-selection (although we 
noted earlier that it is further developed by constant exposure to a professional 
world in which all things are monetised).   The values of mutuality (equity), and 
anti-consumerism seems unlikely to be significantly attributable to self-selection, 
if only because they involve ideas with which most prospective entrants to the 
profession will not be familiar.   The origins of the other values are more 
difficult to judge.   It seems possible that the staid reputation of the profession 
attracts the socially conservative rather than the unconventional, and the prudent 
rather than the injudicious;  but both these values, especially the latter, are also 
inculcated by actuarial training. 
 
3.2 The case of economics 
 
 Evidence of the importance of both self-selection and professional inculcation of 
values has been provided in a paper by Frank et al (1993), which investigates the 
effects of graduate study of economics on individuals' cynicism and selfishness.  
 In a series of controlled experiments involving prisoner's dilemma games and 
self-reports of honesty, they found that: 
 
 (a) students registering for economics courses were more cynical and more 
selfish than a control group of students registering for an astronomy 
course; 
 
 (b) the economics students became more cynical and more selfish as they 
progressed through the course. 
 
 In a separate study, Frank et al also found that after controlling for variations in 
income, academic economists were amongst the least generous of all academic 
disciplinary groupings in their charitable giving, and were more likely than any 
other grouping to be pure free riders (that is, to report giving no money 
whatsoever to charity).   More recently, Frank has reported further evidence that 
charitable giving, after controlling for variations in income, declines in 
progression with number of years' study of economics (FT, 1996). 
 
 Frank et al conclude that whilst self-selection is part of the explanation of the 
more cynical and selfish behaviour of economists, the nature of the discipline 
itself inculcates cynicism and selfishness.   In particular, they note that 
economics places very heavy emphasis on the role of self-interest as the 
motivation of human behaviour, and on related phenomena such as moral hazard 
and adverse selection.   The discipline of economics, and perhaps some 
economists, may be uncomprehending of a world in which people rescue 
drowning men, or give their wealth to charity, or pursue other actions which are 
not motivated purely by self-interest.    
 
 The foibles of economists (incidentally, one of the authors is by training an 
economist!) would perhaps not matter except for the fact that economics and 
economists claim to provide explanations for human behaviour in general - and 
in doing so, may tend to assume their own degree of cynicism is shared by 
others.   This may indeed be the case, but the experiments outlined above 
suggest it is at least questionable.    
 
 Readers may have noticed that some of the economic concepts mentioned above 
- adverse selection and moral hazard - have particular relevance in insurance.   
Actuaries tend, of course, to be concerned to emphasise strongly the importance 
of such behaviours when discussing insurance with legislators.  In doing so, they 
may be in danger, like the economists, of assuming that their own degree of 
cynicism and selfishness is shared by others.    
 
 None of what we say here denies that self-interest is the primary motivation of 
most human endeavour, nor that adverse selection and moral hazard are 
inevitable consequences of such self-interest.   That people are self-interested is 
not in dispute;  the question is to what extent, and for whom, other motivations 
are important.   Part of the answer appears to be that selfish motivations may be 
more important for those who say that they are;  and also for those who work 
within disciplines or professional groupings which emphasise such motivations. 




 Our conclusion is that, as in other disciplines such as economics, both self-
selection and inculcation play a part in the development of actuarial values.   
This is not very surprising.   But even if we cannot be sure where values come 
from, we can ask whether they have served us well, and whether they will 
continue to do so in the future.   It is to this question that we now turn.    
 
4. Actuarial values versus social values 
 
 
4.1 A values audit 
 
 In a broader context, one view of the evolution of human values (Sharp, 1997) is 
that in primitive societies values evolved so as to increase the chances of the 
survival of the society.   In this Darwinist view, the societies which prospered 
were those with the most `successful' values.   Typically, values have effect by 
restraining individual self-interested behaviour in ways which promote the long 
term success of the society as a whole.   For example, in many western societies 
there are restrictions on, or obstacles to, divorce and remarriage.   These may in 
many cases reduce individual happiness, but may also promote the long term 
stability and success of society as a whole.    
 
 Extending the principle from societies to professional groupings, we suggest that 
the professions which prosper will be those with the most successful values - 
that is, values which restrain individual self-interested behaviour in ways which 
maximise the chances of long-term success for the profession as a whole.   In 
this sense, have the actuarial values outlined in section 2 above served us well? 
 
 Our prudence has arguably been a major factor in legislators entrusting us to 
ensure the financial solvency of the insurance industry:  that is, these values are a 
large part of the reason for the long-term success of the profession.   Our concern 
with mutuality and equity sets us apart from other numerate professions, and has 
probably contributed to an aura of propriety and responsibility (not to mention a 
little mystique) surrounding the profession.   As regards conservatism, this is a 
feature of most professions;  and probably a beneficial one, at least in 
moderation. 
 
 The pecuniary perspective, as we noted earlier, is a useful prism for viewing the 
world;  but difficulties may arise if we assume that our perspective is shared by 
others.   For example, attempts to justify decisions or actions on the basis of the 
costs (for example, in cost-benefit analysis) may encounter resistance which 
actuaries find difficult to accept or even to understand.    
 
 The value of `collective before individual concern' was uncontroversial when the 
rest of society shared this value, or at least was acquiescent towards it.   But in 
the last 20 years or so, there has been a legislative impetus towards individual 
rights;  the various anti-discrimination Acts mentioned earlier are one 
manifestation of this.   In this area, the actuarial profession seems to be finding 
itself increasingly out of sympathy with public opinion.   As we noted in section 
2.8, the presidents of actuarial societies worldwide find it necessary to criticise 
human rights legislation;  but there seems every likelihood that the social and 
legislative trends towards greater individual rights will continue.  It is not 
obvious what long term advantages a profession can gain from appearing always 
and everywhere hostile to human rights legislation, and by implication towards 
the individuals whose rights it seeks to advance.    
 
 As regards anti-consumerism, it is difficult to see how this value has benefited 
the profession, at least in the UK context with which the authors are most 
familiar.   Almost all the consumer protection legislation to which actuaries have 
been opposed has been enacted anyway.   Scandals such as the misselling of 
personal pensions have erupted in our own backyard, and actuaries have been 
widely criticised for their complaisance or even complicity in such malpractice.  
 If actuaries had been less dismissive of consumerism and its advocates, such 
embarrassing developments as this might possibly have been mitigated.    
 
 In summary, most of the values of actuaries appear to have been beneficial, 
except perhaps for anti-consumerism.   Hostility towards human rights 
legislation has so far done the profession little harm, but it is increasingly at 
variance with wider political opinion;  it is not obvious to us how this value can 
remain tenable in the long term. 
 
4.2 Values into the 21st century 
 
 The rise of consumerism, and the pressure to circumscribe or outlaw statistical 
discrimination in the guise of human rights legislation, are both trends which 
seem likely to continue into the 21st century.   They present challenges for any 
profession whose traditional values are inimical to these trends.   In our view it 
would be politically ill-advised, and probably in the long run simply untenable, 
for actuaries to continue to be hostile to these trends in the ways which they have 
been in the past.  The actuarial profession needs to find ways of accommodating 
and even embracing such trends, rather than fighting losing battles against the 
tide of social history. 
 





 Actuarial work is not a culture-free activity.   Actuarial thought and practice is 
guided by a loosely shared set of values, which we defined as fundamental 
concepts which we use to guide our patterns of thought and behaviour and which 
are not very susceptible to change, at least in the short term. 
 
 We identified actuarial values as including prudence, conservatism, the 
pecuniary perspective, equity, collective over individual concern, anti-
consumerism and hostility towards human rights legislation.   We suggested that 
most of these values had served us well and would continue to do so.   However, 
anti-consumerism has not been particularly beneficial to the profession.   The 
general hostility of actuaries to certain causes which commend great political 
and legislative support, such as human rights legislation, seems politically 




 We have argued above that certain actuarial values - anti-consumerism and 
general opposition to human rights legislation - will not be helpful to the 
profession's future, because they tend to place it in a position of conflict with 
wider society;  and therefore that these values should be modified.   This is a 
pragmatic argument which, if its premise is accepted, should appeal to the self-
interest of actuaries.   But our pragmatic use of an argument based on self-
interest does not mean that we see no other justification.  On the contrary, we see 
a much more important deontological justification for advocating that the 
actuarial profession should aim to be supportive of human rights legislation.  
Doing the right thing can be its own reward, even if (or perhaps especially when) 
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